TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=92TT2083> <title> Sep. 21, 1992: Intelligence:A Legacy of Contempt </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1992 Sep. 21, 1992 Hollywood & Politics </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> INTELLIGENCE, Page 29 A Legacy of Contempt </hdr><body> As a former CIA officer awaits retrial, his case tells a cautionary tale about the agency's responsibilities to Congress By Bruce Van Voorst/Washington Clair George was back in Washington last week, after a Maine vacation where he satisfied his voracious reading habit and worked on his tennis serve. Next month he will be playing for higher stakes as federal prosecutors try to nail him for lying to Congress about the Iran-contra affair. Though the former CIA chief of clandestine operations received a respite three weeks ago when a jury could not reach a verdict on nine counts of perjury, making false statements and obstruction of justice, he now faces a retrial at the hands of special prosecutor Craig Gillen. Just as he did last time, Gillen can be expected to put the entire CIA on trial by charging that George was merely the pawn in an agency that had consistently shown contempt for Congress, for due process and ultimately for the American people. It will be up to a new jury to decide whether George was guilty of criminal perjury. Steven Kirk, the original foreman, said his fellow jurors had found George evasive, duplicitous and dissembling; they could not agree on conviction because they chose to wrestle with the narrow issue of George's "technical" responsibility to Congress. But Gillen used expert testimony and thousands of newly declassified documents to prove his point: that key officials of the CIA had blindly served the White House in circumventing Congress by providing aid to the Nicaraguan contras in defiance of the Boland amendment. Concedes a CIA veteran: "In the crunch, as an institution, it failed the people." The agency has always felt a special allegiance to the President. Although it was created by Congress, and is funded annually by congressional appropriations, generations of CIA topsiders have enjoyed a privileged entree at the Oval Office. The agency historically stood ready to perform special tasks for the White House and developed what one insider calls "an absolute loyalty to the President." But the Iran-contra episode put officials in the unenviable position of testifying against a President who denied any knowledge of the illegal operation, although onetime National Security Council staff member Oliver North later wrote that "President Reagan knew everything." On the eve of George's indictment, friends pleaded with him not to take a fall for Ronald Reagan. But turning on his Commander in Chief was not George's style. He gruffly rejected a plea bargain in return for implicating those above him. All of George's training and experience made such a deal unthinkable. After three decades in the agency's clandestine service, he was imbued with the shadow-world ethos of the cold war. His generation of CIA officers perceived themselves in an intensely personal crusade against the Evil Empire. George valiantly fought these looking-glass battles in extraordinarily dangerous assignments in Beirut and Athens, where his predecessor had been assassinated. It was a covert existence in which professional spies like George routinely broke other nations' laws. It was part of their job to lie about their identities, their missions, their actions--but not to their own superiors. And especially not to Congress. "That," says former CIA staffer Vincent Cannistraro, "was the no-no." Yet few beliefs were as widely shared by agency types as their low regard for Capitol Hill. In the 1970s, following embarrassing revelations about failed assassinations and bungled covert operations, Congress set up an oversight system and tried to put the agency on a shorter leash. Some CIA officials, including former Director William Colby, applauded the move. "I thought things had changed for good," says Colby. They had not. George's mentor, former Director William Casey, was legendary for his utter contempt of Congress. The same attitude was expressed by former senior CIA officer Ray Cline, who complained after George's indictment last fall that "the only thing Clair has ever been accused of is lying to Congress." In the eyes of some agency veterans, Alan Fiers, chief of CIA's Central American Task Force, who admitted his own guilt in lying to Congress, was a "turncoat" for testifying against George; current spy chief Thomas Twetten was deemed a hero for stonewalling. At one point during the trial, George banged his fist on the railing and denounced "those goddamned hypocrites" in Congress. "Congress wanted to set somebody up," he shouted, "and I walked right into it." Nonsense. As former Senator Thomas Eagleton testified, Congress just wanted the truth. "[We] didn't put a noose around Clair George's neck," said Eagleton. "Clair George put a noose around his neck." Former CIA Director William Webster believes that most agency staff members have learned the lessons of the Iran-contra debacle, and is against retrying George on practical grounds. If punishment is required, he argues, Clair George has already suffered profoundly. If it's a warning to other CIA officials that is needed, the message is abundantly clear. When he became director in 1987, Webster says, he introduced what he calls four C's on dealing with Congress: be candid, correct, complete and consistent. His successor, Robert Gates, would do well to pin this motto up on the agency's bulletin boards. </body></article> </text>